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Abstract 
A growing body of research examines relationships between cognitive tendencies and a 
number of personality and affective (i.e. emotional) traits.  While several mechanisms 
have been suggested to explain these links, the exact reasons for the observed effects 
remain unclear in a number of circumstances.  The current research examines the 
potential underlying mechanisms of observed links between cognitive error reactivity and 
various components of the affect regulation process; those individuals who make errors in 
strings on standard cognitive tasks are higher in trait negative affect, react more strongly 
to negative daily events, and may show deficits in self-regulation ability (Compton, 
Robinson, Ode, Quandt, Fineman, & Carp, 2008).  The current study tests whether 
observed links between cognitive error reactivity and affective traits/processes are due to 
affect reactivity (Larsen, & Ketelaar, 1989) or affect regulation ability (Hemenover, 
Augustine, Shulman, Tran, & Barlett, 2008). Participants completed measures of both 
personality and error reactivity and then underwent an anxiety induction followed by one 
of three affect regulation tasks.  Results reveal that neither affect reactivity (i.e., reaction 
to the anxiety induction) nor affect regulation ability (i.e., affective change due to the 
regulation task) adequately explain links between error reactivity and personality.  The 
implications of these findings for both personality and cognitive psychology are 
discussed. 
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Personal Cognition and the Affect Regulation Process: Affect Reactivity, Affect 
Regulation Ability, and Responses to Cognitive Errors. 
 Recent research reveals links between more stable and “cold” cognitive 
tendencies, such as working memory and error reactivity, and a number of personality 
and affective (i.e. emotional) traits (e.g., Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008; 
Compton, Robinson, Ode, Quandt, Fineman, & Carp, 2008; Augustine & Larsen, in 
press).  While several mechanisms have been suggested to explain these links, the exact 
reasons for the observed effects remain unclear in a number of circumstances.  Of 
primary interest for the current research are the observed links between cognitive error 
reactivity and various components of the affect regulation process; those individuals who 
make errors in strings on standard cognitive tasks are higher in trait negative affect, react 
more strongly to negative daily events, and may show deficits in self-regulation ability 
(Compton, et al., 2008).  The goal of the current research is to examine whether observed 
links between cognitive error reactivity and affective traits/processes are due to affect 
reactivity (Larsen, & Ketelaar, 1989) or affect regulation ability (Hemenover, Augustine, 
Shulman, Tran, & Barlett, 2008).  First, I review the extant literature on the links between 
cognitive and personality variables.  Second, I examine the function of affect reactivity 
and affect regulation ability with regards to the process of affect regulation.  Third, I 
review individual differences in affect reactivity and the ways in which cognitive error 
reactivity may relate to the process of affect reactivity.  Finally, I examine individual 
differences in affect regulation ability and the potential relationship between cognitive 
error reactivity to these individual differences.   
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Personal Cognition 
 Whereas social cognition examines the links between cognitive tendencies and 
social behavior, a growing body of research examines links between cognitive tendencies 
and personality processes, or personal cognition.  The majority of the findings to date 
suggest that these relationships may be largely observed for those personality traits with 
an affective (i.e., emotional) component.  This is consistent with established links 
between temporary affective states and cognition. The interplay between temporary 
affective states and cognition has received a massive amount of research attention across 
several distinct literature areas.  Indeed, mounting evidence suggests that temporary 
affect and cognition are, in the least, dependent on one another (Storbeck & Clore, 2007), 
or at most, not treated differently by the brain (Duncan & Feldman Barrett, 2007).  Given 
the wide links between affective states and cognition, it should not be surprising that 
affective traits are also related to cognition.  Negative affect laden traits such as 
neuroticism, positive affect laden traits such as extraversion, and various components of 
the affect regulation process are related to a number of stable cognitive tendencies, such 
as judgment and decision making style (Hilbig, 2008; Hirsh, Morisano, & Peterson, 2008; 
Lauriola & Levin, 2001; Davis, Patte, Tweed, & Curtis, 2007; Augustine & Larsen, in 
press), working memory capacity (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 
2008; Schmeichel, et al., 2008; Mikels, Reuter-Lorenz, Beyer, & Fredrickson, 2008), and 
error reactivity (Robinson, Meier, Wilkowski, & Ode, 2007; Robinson, Ode, Wilkowski, 
& Amodio, 2007; Compton et al., 2008; Augustine & Larsen, 2010).  In this section I 
review the literature on personal cognition and describe the primary topic of the current 
research - error reactivity and trait affect.   
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Personality and Decision Making 
As individuals seek to process their surroundings and make decisions, affect 
serves as a constant source of information, especially when deliberative thinking is either 
not possible or not appropriate.  As Slovic and Peters (2006) stated, “ Although analysis 
is certainly important in some decision-making circumstances, reliance on affect is 
generally a quicker, easier, and more efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain, 
and sometimes dangerous world (pp 322).”  State affect leads to the use of certain 
heuristics and the exhibition of certain biases in a variety of decision making tasks.  For 
instance, when estimating yearly accident fatalities, those experiencing positive affect 
provide higher estimates than those experiencing negative affect (Johnson & Tversky, 
1983).   In addition, those experiencing negative affect are more likely to reject offers in 
the ultimatum game (Harle & Sanfey, 2007).  Finally, both naturally occurring and 
induced happiness predict selective attention to rewarding stimuli (Tamir & Robinson, 
2007). 
Just as state affect may serve as a temporary source of quick and (usually) 
efficient information, trait affect may serve as a constant source of information.  In other 
words, trait affect may inform decision making in a stable and global manner.  Recent 
evidence suggests that this is the case for four different decision making realms: heuristic 
usage, risky decision making, performance deficits, and susceptibility to irrelevant 
information.   
First, affective traits are predictive of the degree to which individuals rely on 
certain heuristics when making decisions.  Neuroticism, a negative affect laden trait, is 
predictive of the use of the recognition heuristic.  When asked to estimate city population 
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size, those higher in neuroticism are more likely to base their judgments on their 
familiarity with the city, rather than actual population information (Hilbig, 2008).  
Affective traits are also predictive of the degree to which individuals choose smaller 
rewards today rather than larger rewards in the future, or temporal discounting (for a 
review of temporal discounting, see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002).  
Those high in extraversion or neuroticism and lower in cognitive ability show a tendency 
towards greater temporal discounting (Hirsh, et al., 2008).  Second, neuroticism predicts 
the types of risks individuals are willing to take.  Those higher in neuroticism are apt to 
make less risky decisions to achieve gains, but more risky decisions to avoid losses 
(Lauriola & Levin, 2001).  Third, those higher in impulsivity and sensitivity to reward 
(positive affect laden traits) as well as sensitivity to punishment (a negative affect laden 
trait) show more performance deficits on the Iowa Gambling Task (Davis, et al., 2007).  
Finally, extraversion and neuroticism interact with the valence of primes seen before 
making probability judgments.  Those higher in extraversion make higher probability 
judgments in response to positive primes while those higher in neuroticism make lower 
probability judgments in response to negative primes, even when state affect is controlled 
(Augustine & Larsen, in press).  
In sum, trait affect may inform judgment and decision making at a broad and 
global level just as state or temporary affect informs judgment and decision making at a 
temporary level.  Thus, a first link between stable affective traits and stable cognitive 
tendencies (i.e. decision making styles) is observed.  However, evidence for the existence 
of personal cognition exists beyond the judgment and decision making literature.  
Working memory span is also related to stable affective tendencies.   
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Working Memory and Affect Regulation 
 Individuals differ in the degree to which they are able to regulate their behavior 
and affect.  Several studies suggest that these differences in regulation ability may be due, 
in part, to differences in working memory capacity.  Those with larger working memory 
capacities are better able to regulate their automatic behavioral and affective responses 
(Hofmann, et al., 2008).  In other words, larger working memory capacities may facilitate 
self-regulation behavior.  In line with this, working memory capacity predicts 
individuals’ ability to engage in affect regulation, and these increased abilities lead to 
improved regulatory consequences (i.e. more positive and less negative affect, 
Schmeichel, et al., 2008).   
 Affective information takes up space in working memory and affect regulation 
may, in part, function by interrupting the maintenance of this information.  With a larger 
working memory capacity, more cognitive resources would be available for the 
deployment of a regulation attempt, despite the resources occupied by affective 
information.  In other words, those with smaller working memory capacities could have 
such a large portion of their cognitive resources depleted by affective experience itself, 
that no resources are available for regulation. Working memory may also possess a 
uniquely affective component.   Any individual with deficits in the affective components 
of working memory may show a decreased ability to repair affect (Mikels, et al., 2008).   
 Regardless of any specific causal links between working memory capacity and 
self-regulation ability, these findings indicate yet another link between “cold” cognitive 
tendencies and affective traits (i.e., regulation ability).  The final area of personal 
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cognition to be discussed herein concerns error reactivity, and it is this cognitive 
tendency that is directly relevant to the current research. 
Error Reactivity 
At a broad level, trait negative affect is related to cognitive control, such that 
those higher in negative affect show lessened cognitive control, or a lessened ability to 
inhibit dominant responses (i.e. attend to negative stimuli; Moriya & Tanno, 2008).  The 
effects of this lack of control on affect regulation behavior can be observed by measuring 
individuals’ reaction to errors.  There are two primary ways of encapsulating cognitive 
error reactivity: post-error slowing and the tendency to make errors in strings. 
In standard cognitive tasks (i.e., the Stroop task), some individuals show greater 
post-error slowing, or the tendency to slow down on the trial following a trial on which 
an error was committed.  This slowing tendency is thought to represent the ability to 
detect performance threats (i.e., mistakes) as they occur.  While this slowing tendency or 
threat detection ability does not directly relate to affective traits, affective traits interact 
with post-error slowing to predict affective reactions.  Post-error slowing interacts with 
extraversion to predict displayed levels of anxiety, such that those low in extraversion 
and high in slowing tendency display more anxiety (Robinson, Meier, Wilkowski, & 
Ode, 2007).  Post-error slowing also interacts with neuroticism, such that those high in 
neuroticism and high in post-error slowing show lower levels of daily distress (Robinson, 
Ode, Wilkowski, & Amodio, 2007).   While post-error slowing may not directly relate to 
these affective traits, the second error-reactivity measure, the tendency to make errors in 
strings, is directly related to neuroticism. 
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Some individuals show a tendency to make errors in strings in standard cognitive 
tasks; they are likely to make more than one error in a row.  This tendency (as measured 
with the Stroop, AX-CPT, and N-back tasks) is directly related to neuroticism (Compton 
et al., 2008; Augustine & Larsen, 2010); those who make errors in strings are higher in 
neuroticism.  While generally related to trait negative affect, this tendency may be 
specifically relevant for anxiety related behavior.  The tendency to make errors in strings 
is related more strongly to the anxiety subfacet of neuroticism (Augustine & Larsen, 
2010) and moderates the relationships between daily stress and anxiety, such that those 
who are more likely to make errors in strings show a stronger relationship between daily 
stress and anxiety (Compton et al., 2008). Genetic and neurological evidence also support 
the links between error-reactivity and affective traits. 
At a genetic level of analysis, the same gene alleles that regulate negative 
affective functioning may also play a role in general cognitive functioning.  A 
polymorphism in the control region (5-HTTLPR) of the serotonin transporter gene 5-HT 
has been consistently linked to trait negative affect.  Those who possess the short allele in 
this region show lower serotonin uptake (for a review, see Lesch & Canli, 2006).  The 
neurotransmitter serotonin is a well established determinant/marker of a variety of 
negative affect disorders and traits.  Those possessing the short 5-HTTLPR allele do 
show higher levels of trait negative affect in the form of depression (Canli et al, 2006), 
anxiety, and neuroticism (Lesch et al, 1996).  At a cognitive level, this allele length also 
predicts differential brain activation in response to neutral stimuli, indicating that the 5-
HTTLPR region may play a role in broader cognitive functions (Canli et al., 2005).  In 
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other words, the same genetic structure is related to both affective and cognitive 
functioning.   
At a neurological level, error regulation and affective functioning are associated 
with activation in the same brain regions.  The anterior cingulate cortex is thought to be 
involved in emotion regulation (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Hajcak & Foti, 2008).  This 
region has also been shown to be involved in error avoidance and monitoring (Brown & 
Braver, 2005).  In addition, this brain region shows a response when errors are made, the 
degree of this response predicts the magnitude of negative reaction to the error, and this 
response is modulated by affective variables (Hajcak & Foti, 2008).   Thus, not only is 
the link between cognition and trait affect observable at a genetic level, the link between 
error reactivity and trait affect is also observable at a neurological level. 
 In sum, broad associations between a variety of cognitive processes and trait 
affective variables suggest that we should consider individual differences in cognition in 
our efforts to understand affect regulation.  Of particular interest is the error reactivity 
process and, more specifically, the tendency to make errors in strings.  This tendency is 
associated with negative affective traits and anxiety in particular, and moderates 
individuals’ reactions to aversive events.   
There are two potential explanations for the observed links between the tendency 
to make errors in strings and the affect regulation process.  One is that this tendency 
captures or explains individual differences in affect reactivity (i.e. Larsen & Ketelaar, 
1989), or the degree of an individual’s reaction to an affective stimulus.  That is, the 
stronger an individual’s typical negative affective reactions, the more likely they will be 
to make errors in strings.  The other explanation is that this tendency to make errors in 
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strings captures or explains individual differences in the ability to repair negative affect 
(i.e. Hemenover et al., 2008).  That is, the lower a person’s ability to regulate or repair 
negative affect, the more likely they will be to make errors in strings. In the next section, 
I review the role of affect reactivity and regulation ability in the affect regulation process.  
I then review individual differences in affect reactivity and regulation ability and describe 
how the tendency to make errors in strings may relate to each of these constructs. 
The Affect Regulation System 
Gross (1998) defines emotion regulation as a set of “processes by which 
individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they 
experience and express these emotions (pg. 275).” One might attempt to decrease, 
increase, or maintain their current emotions.  For instance, when in a particularly 
unpleasant mood, one might attempt to decrease their experience of negative affect and 
increase their experience of positive affect.  When in a good mood, one might attempt to 
maintain that good mood.  Individuals also attempt to alter the frequency of certain 
affective experiences.  Some people try to avoid situations that increase negative affect 
and seek out situations that promote positive affect.  Additionally, individuals attempt to 
alter the manner in which they express emotion.  Someone might make a “happy face” to 
show that they identify with another person’s positive experiences. Three major models 
(Gross, 1998; Bonnano, 2001; Larsen, 2000) have been proposed that describe the 
processes that individuals engage in when attempting to regulate their affective 
experiences. 
In Gross’(1998) model, regulatory efforts are either response focused or 
antecedent focused.  That is, people either regulate emotion while they are experiencing 
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an emotional episode (response focused) or attempt to control the emotions that they may 
experience in the future (antecedent focused).  These two goals are accomplished through 
a set of five specific regulation efforts.  First, individuals engage in situation selection; 
they choose environments that are consistent with, or might produce, their desired 
affective state.  When in an affectively relevant situation, one engages the second 
regulation effort, situation modification. In situation modification, one attempts to alter 
components of the situation that are inconsistent with the desired affective state.  Third, 
attention deployment is used to attend to stimuli that are consistent with their regulatory 
goals.  When a situation is not consistent with regulatory goals, a cognitive change (the 
fourth regulation effort) may be necessary to interpret the meaning of the situation in a 
manner consistent with regulatory goals.  Finally, one may engage in response 
modulation, whereby their emotional response tendencies are influenced once they have 
been elicited (Gross, 1998).   
 Bonanno (2001) offers another model by which individuals purposely alter their 
affective experiences.  Central to this model is the idea of emotional homeostasis, a 
process by which an individual engages in efforts to achieve and maintain a desired 
emotional state.  Similar to cellular homeostasis, the process of emotional homeostasis 
focuses on eliminating affects not in-line with the desired emotional state and increasing 
or maintaining affects consistent with the desired emotional state.  To achieve or maintain 
this emotional homeostasis, one engages in a set of three regulation efforts; control 
regulation, anticipatory regulation, and exploratory regulation.  If one is currently 
experiencing an emotional response not in-line with their homeostasis point, they engage 
in control regulation, which includes automatic and instrumental behaviors used for the 
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purpose of immediate affect regulation.  When the homeostasis point is achieved, one 
then begins anticipatory regulation.  In anticipatory regulation, one attempts to eliminate 
future experiences that would direct them away from homeostasis and encourage 
experiences that would maintain homeostasis.  Finally, if control and anticipatory 
regulation efforts are successful, one can then attempt to develop new skills, knowledge, 
or resources that will aid in future regulatory efforts through a process known as 
exploratory regulation (Bonanno, 2001).  In this model, any experience that gives one 
information pertaining to future regulation is classified as exploratory regulation.   
 The idea of an emotional homeostasis point is not unique to Bonanno’s (2001) 
model of affect regulation.  Although called the affective set point in this model, Larsen 
(2000) also proposes a model of affect regulation in which individual’s attempt to reach 
an “affective norm.”  In Larsen’s (2000) model, individuals are aware (consciously or 
not) of their desired affective set point and go through a continual process in which they 
compare their current affective state to this set point.  Should an inconsistency exist 
between their desired set point and their current affective state, a regulation process is 
engaged to address the discrepancy.   
 In all of these models, individuals engage in some type of regulatory effort when 
their current affective experience is inconsistent with their desired affective experience.  
However, the degree of inconsistency between desired and current affective experience is 
largely dependent on affect reactivity.  If individuals react to affective stimuli in a 
differential manner, then the frequency and efficacy of regulation required to maintain a 
desired state would be based on these reactions.  Indeed, individual differences exist in 
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affect reactivity, and these differences in affect reactivity are related to neuroticism in the 
same manner as are differences in error reactivity. 
Affect Reactivity 
Steeped in animal learning theory and the effects of anxiolytic (anti-anxiety) 
medications, the work of Jeffrey Gray (1971, 1981, 1987; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; 
for a review, see Fowles, 2006) was the first to examine potential differences in the way 
individuals respond to affective stimuli.  Gray’s theory of personality is based on two 
separate neurological systems that govern sensitivity to environmental cues of reward and 
punishment.  These systems, which he termed the behavioral activation (BAS) and 
behavioral inhibition systems (BIS) regulate behavior in the presence of cues for reward 
and punishment, respectively. Gray thought that these systems exhibited trait-like 
properties; stable individual differences exist in the sensitivity of these two systems.  In 
other words, one could have a habitually sensitive (or insensitive) BAS or BIS.   
Individuals with habitually sensitive (or more active/reactive) behavioral activation 
systems would be more likely to react to signals of reward and those with active 
behavioral inhibition systems would be more likely to react to signals of punishment.  
The output of reactions to these signals comes in the form of affect, with reaction to 
reward creating positive and reaction to punishment creating negative affect.   
 The research to date has generally supported Gray’s initial notions regarding the 
mechanism of affect reactivity.  In experimental tests of the theory, participants report 
their affective state, undergo an affect induction procedure, and then report their affective 
state a second time.  The degree to which affectively relevant personality variables 
predict participant’s reactions to the affect induction are then examined.  Individuals with 
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high trait positive affect exhibit a larger positive affect reaction to positive affect 
inductions and those with high trait negative affect exhibit a larger negative affect 
reaction to negative affect inductions.   
In the first study to experimentally examine affect reactivity, Larsen and Ketelaar 
(1991; see also Rusting & Larsen, 1997, 1999; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000) demonstrated 
that extraversion and neuroticism predict reactions to positive and negative affect stimuli, 
respectively.  The existence of reactivity differences centering around extraversion and 
neuroticism has been replicated using a variety of affect induction procedures such as 
guided imagery (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991), false performance feedback (Larsen & 
Ketelaar, 1989), viewing affective images (Zelenski & Larsen, 2000), and viewing 
affective films (Hemenover, 2003; Hemenover, Augustine, Shulman, Tran, & Barlett, 
2008),  
The affect reactivity findings for neuroticism have also been extended into non-
laboratory settings using experience sampling designs. Neurotics experience more 
negative health symptoms (Larsen & Kasimatis, 1991), undesirable events (David, Green, 
Martin, & Suls, 1997), and general problems (Suls & Martin, 2005) than do their 
emotionally stable counterparts.  They also react more strongly when these daily troubles 
arise.  For instance, neuroticism predicts greater reactivity to interpersonal conflicts (Suls, 
Martin, & David, 1998).  Neurotics also react with more distress to negative stress 
appraisals (Cimbolic Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli, 1999).     
All of the above studies rely on self-reported levels of affect to establish the 
occurrence of an affect reactivity process.  These processes may also be observable at a 
physiological level.  This would be an appropriate finding given Gray’s focus on the 
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physiological basis of the reactivity/sensitivity process.  Indeed, several findings suggest 
that individuals do experience physiological reactivity to signals of reward and 
punishment.  Extraversion and neuroticism predict the magnitude of facial-emotional 
responses to positive and negative stimuli, respectively (Berenbaum & Williams, 1995). 
In addition, neuroticism predicts greater skin conductance reactivity (as well as a more 
prolonged response) to negative stimuli (Norris, Larsen, & Cacioppo, 2007).  
Neuroticism also predicts heightened, non-specific electrodermal activity, suggesting 
hyperactivity of the sympathetic nervous system on the part of those higher in 
neuroticism (Larsen & Cruz, 1995). At a neural level, extraversion and neuroticism 
predict brain activation in response to positive and negative stimuli, respectively; these 
effects are observable across a number of different brain regions (Canli, Zhao, Desmond, 
Kang, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2001).  Finally, the brain asymmetries associated with 
extraversion and neuroticism are also predictive of differential reactions to positive and 
negative affect, respectively (Wheeler, Davidson, & Tomarken, 1993). 
In sum, individuals differ in the degree to which they react to affective stimuli.  
This process of affect reactivity has been consistently linked to neuroticism in both the 
laboratory and field, and with both behavioral and physiological measures.  The links 
between neuroticism and affect reactivity are directly relevant for findings regarding 
error reactivity. 
 Error Reactivity and Affect Reactivity 
The existence of a reactivity process has been consistently demonstrated using 
affective stimuli.  However, individuals show differential reactions to non-affective 
stimuli as well, particularly to markers of reward and punishment.  Those higher in BAS 
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react with more positive affect to signals of reward and those higher in BIS react with 
more negative affect to signals of punishment (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000).  In addition, 
those high in BAS experience more positive affect when seeking reward and those high 
in BIS experience more negative affect when placed under stress (Heponiemi, 
Keltikangas-Jarvinen, Puttonen, & Ravaja, 2003).  Finally, extraversion predicts positive 
affect reactivity to monetary gain whereas neuroticism predicts negative affect reactivity 
to monetary losses (Gomez, Cooper, & Gomez, 2000). 
Making an error in a standard cognitive task may also be a form of punishment.  
In some cases this is explicit, as when feedback is given for errors.  In easier tasks, no 
feedback is necessary as a mistake in the task is quite obvious.  If neuroticism predicts 
responses to more overt forms of punishment (i.e. monetary loss), it may also predict 
responses to mistakes and signals of punishment in these cognitive tasks.  These 
responses to errors in standard cognitive tasks would come in the form of error reactivity.  
If an individual reacted more strongly to an error on a trial, that reaction would disrupt 
responses on the ensuing trial.  Any disruption of response would increase the likelihood 
of a second error.  Thus, with a stronger reaction to a mistake, an individual prone to 
more intense reactions to punishment (i.e., a neurotic) would be more likely to make 
errors on ensuing trials.  It is in this manner that findings linking neuroticism and anxiety 
to the tendency to make errors in string (Compton et al., 2008) may be explained by 
individual differences in affect reactivity. 
While affect reactivity may explain the observed findings linking error reactivity 
and affective traits/processes, it is also possible that self-regulation ability provides an 
alternative explanation for these effects.  Given the affective nature of the variables 
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associated with the tendency to make errors in strings, affect regulation (rather than some 
broader form of self-regulation) is of primary interest in attempting to explain these 
findings.  
Affect Regulation 
 The efficacy of any attempt to regulate affective experience is dependent on two 
factors: the type of regulation strategy used and the ability to use that strategy.  If 
individuals use more effective strategies, then the affect regulation attempt is more 
successful.  If individuals are higher in affect regulation ability, then any regulation 
attempt, regardless of the type of strategy employed, should be more effective.  In this 
section, I review difference in affect regulation strategy effectiveness and affect 
regulation ability.  
In general, people want to feel happy; we wish to experience mild positive affect 
most of the time (Rusting & Larsen, 1995; Larsen, 2000; Augustine, Hemenover, Larsen, 
& Shulman, 2010).   Given this, most affect regulation efforts are aimed at affect repair, 
or efforts to decrease levels of negative affect and increase or maintain levels of positive 
affect.  Thus, the efficacy of any affect regulation strategy is usually defined by how well 
that strategy allows one to repair a negative affective state.  However, not all affect 
regulation strategies are created equal.  Certain strategies have been demonstrated to be 
more effective means of affect repair than others.   
Regardless of popular claims to the contrary, catharsis (venting), is ineffective at 
reducing negative affect and actually increases bad feelings (Geen & Quanty, 1977; 
Bushman, 2002).  These findings suggest that, if you hit a pillow because you are angry 
at your boss, your anger levels would likely increase rather than decrease.  Yet another 
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strategy found to be ineffective at reducing negative affect and increasing positive affect 
is suppression (i.e., hiding one’s feelings).  Although those using suppression report less 
negative affect, physiological measures show that they are actually experiencing higher 
levels of emotional arousal than before the repair effort began (Gross & John, 2003).  
Thus, attempting to suppress the urge to cry will actually produce physiological arousal 
patterns more intense than if you had just allowed yourself to cry.  Catharsis and 
suppression are well known examples of frequently employed strategies that produce 
results opposite of what is intended. 
Despite these examples, numerous effective strategies for the repair of affect do 
exist.  Downward social comparison can be an effective regulation strategy; merely 
thinking about those who “have it worse” has positive affective consequences (Aspinwall 
& Taylor, 1993).  Attempting to avoid the future experience of negative affect is also an 
effective method of affect regulation.  If one simply avoids encountering stimuli that are 
known to have negative affect inducing properties, then less negative affect will be 
experienced (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Reappraisal has definite benefits; not only does 
this strategy aid in reducing negative affect, it also has physical, immune, and 
psychological benefits; those who consistently use reappraisal have a lower level of 
physiological-emotional arousal, a decreased probability of future health problems, and 
an increase in subjective well-being (Gross & John, 2003).  Distraction has also been 
shown to be an effective method for affect repair in most situations, having been found to 
decrease depressed mood even in naturally depressed patients (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993).  Finally, an effective way to reduce negative affect and increase positive 
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affect is engaging in rewarding, pleasant activities (Fichman, Koestner, Zuroff, & 
Gordon, 1999).  
In a meta-analysis of the effectiveness of affect regulation strategies, Augustine 
and Hemenover (2009) found that there were wide differences in the effectiveness of 
both specific affect regulation strategies and categories of affect regulation strategies (e.g. 
Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999).  At a broad level, strategies involving distraction and 
reappraisal were the most effective strategies for affect repair.  However, within each 
category of affect repair strategies, broad differences existed between the effectiveness of 
repair attempts in different studies.  Thus, there are wide differences in the effectiveness 
of affect regulation strategies.   
Given the differences in affect regulation strategy effectiveness, the degree to 
which one uses a given strategy could explain any individual differences in a broad 
measure of personal affect regulation success.  As such, the type of affect regulation 
strategy used is controlled in the current research.  However, differences in affect 
regulation effectiveness still exist even when controlling the type of strategy used. 
Those high in extraversion, negative mood regulation expectancies, mood 
monitoring, and mood labeling, and those low in neuroticism demonstrate better affect 
regulation ability (Shulman, Augustine, & Hemenover, 2006; Hemenover, Augustine, 
Shulman, Tran, & Barlett, 2008).  When randomly assigned to engage in an affect 
regulation strategy (after a negative affect induction) participants who possessed more 
positive (and less negative) affective profiles were better able to use the assigned strategy 
for affect regulation.  This means that, given the same stimuli and conditions for a 
19 
 
regulation task, and even if motivated to engage in an effective strategy, certain 
individuals are less able to regulate their affective experiences.  
Additional evidence supports the existence of individual differences in the ability 
to repair affect.  For instance, those high in agreeableness put more effort into their 
regulation attempts (Meier, Robinson, & Wilkowski, 2006).  This effortful and often 
automatic regulation may be partially facilitated by the automatic activation of regulation 
mechanisms in the brain (Haas, Omura, Constable, & Canli, 2007).  Consistent users of 
reappraisal may also gain a similar ability boost, as this strategy also engages early neural 
mechanisms that dampen further negative affect (Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006).  In 
addition to possessing superior repair abilities, extraverts (vs. introverts) are also better 
able to engage in positive mood maintenance (Lischetzke & Eid, 2006) and engage in 
effective affect regulation in even the most benign (i.e. control conditions) settings 
(Augustine & Hemenover, 2008).  Thus, individual differences exist in the ability to 
regulate affect, regardless of the type of strategy employed. These differences may 
account for the observed links between the tendency to make errors in strings and 
affective traits/processes. 
 Error Reactivity and Affect Regulation Ability 
Just as expanding the definition of punishment (i.e. error on a cognitive task) 
allows the use of affect reactivity as an explanation for findings linking the tendency to 
make errors in strings, expanding the definition of an error allows the use of affect 
regulation ability as a mechanism for explaining these findings.  The tendency to make 
errors in strings could be thought of as the tendency to let errors go uncorrected or a 
tendency to let one’s reaction to an error interfere with subsequent behavior (i.e., a 
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breakdown in self-regulation).  This tendency becomes relevant for affect regulation 
ability when one views negative affect as a mistake.  In general, people do not want to 
experience negative affect (Augustine et al, 2010).  Thus, the experience of negative 
affect is, in a sense, an error.  As such, the tendency to let any error (i.e., in a Stroop task) 
go uncorrected may be related to the tendency to let an affective error (i.e., the experience 
of negative affect) go uncorrected.   
A failure to regulate behavior following a cognitive error leads to additional 
errors; the mistakes made are not corrected.  The failure to regulate affect, or failure to 
expend enough effort and regulate affect in an appropriate manner, leads to less effective 
affect regulation.  As was discussed previously, a number of findings suggest that 
affective and cognitive regulation (particularly error reactivity) both rely on the same 
neurological substrates (i.e., the anterior cingulate cortex, Brown & Braver ,2005; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Hajcak & Foti, 2008).  It is possible that all self-regulation 
(cognitive and affective) relies on the same cognitive and neural control systems 
(Compton et al., 2008).  If all regulation shares common systems, then deficits in one 
type of regulation ability may be related to deficits in another.  Regulation of one’s 
affective response to an error in a cognitive task would, in all likelihood, not take place.  
The speed of the tasks would preclude the possibility of engaging in a conscious affect 
regulation attempt.  However, any observed relationships between the tendency to make 
errors in strings and affective variables could be due to common underlying regulation 
systems and a general failure of self-regulation. 
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Overview of the Current Research 
 A growing body of research regarding personal cognition suggests that 
personality is related to a number of “cold” cognitive tendencies, such as decision 
making, working memory, and error reactivity.  However, mechanisms that explain these 
findings are lacking in a number of areas.  Of interest to the current research is the 
process of error reactivity and, in particular, the tendency to make errors in strings.  The 
tendency to make errors in strings has been found to predict neuroticism, anxiety, and 
anxiety responses to stressors.  Two different aspects of the affect regulation process may 
explain these findings: affect reactivity or affect regulation ability.   
Affect reactivity, or the magnitude of reaction to affective stimuli, is related to 
affective traits in a manner similar to that of the tendency to make errors in strings.  In 
addition, differences in affect reactivity have been found for non-affective stimuli.  These 
findings suggest that individuals may make errors in strings because a stronger reaction 
to a mistake on one trial disrupts responses on ensuing trials.  Alternatively, affect 
regulation ability may explain relationships between affective traits and the tendency to 
make errors in strings.  Given shared systems between cognitive and affective regulation, 
it is possible that all errors, including affective errors (i.e. undesired negative affect), are 
monitored in a similar manner.  Thus, a failure to regulate behavior following an error on 
a cognitive task would be indicative of consistent self-regulation failures in a variety of 
domains, including affect regulation.  The goal of the current research is to test these two 
alternative hypotheses.  
These two alternative hypotheses will be tested by examining individual 
differences in anxiety reactivity and anxiety regulation ability.  There are three reasons 
22 
 
for choosing anxiety, rather than global negative affect, as the target of the research. First, 
the process of affect reactivity was initially based on anxiety reactions (see Fowles, 
2006).  Second, the tendency to make errors in strings shows the strongest relationships 
with the anxiety subfacet of neuroticism (Augustine & Larsen, 2010).  Finally, this 
tendency moderates daily relationships between stress and anxiety (Compton et al., 
2008).   
To test these two alternative hypotheses, individuals will undergo an anxiety 
induction and then engage in one of three affect regulation strategies: reappraisal, 
distraction, or control.  These different affect regulation strategies will be used to allow 
for individual differences in affect regulation ability to emerge.  Reappraisal and 
distraction are two highly effective strategies which should allow for wide individual 
differences in ability (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009; Hemenover et al., 2008).  These 
two strategies also differ in the amount of cognitive resources required for 
implementation, with reappraisal consuming more cognitive resources than distraction 
(Sheppes & Meiran, 2008).  Given the influence of stable levels of cognitive resources on 
the affect regulation process (Schmeichel et al., 2008), it is possible that effects could 
emerge only for those strategies requiring few cognitive resources (i.e. distraction).  The 
use of a control condition will also allow for the observance of individual differences in 
affect regulation ability.  Despite the label, “control” conditions are actually highly 
effective means of affect regulation (Augustine and Hemenover, 2009) and do allow for 
the emergence of individual differences in affect regulation ability (Augustine & 
Hemenover, 2008).  
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Using an anxiety induction and three effective affect regulation manipulations, the 
current study examines the potential underlying mechanisms of the observed 
relationships between the tendency to make errors in strings and affective traits.  If this 
tendency is related to participants’ reaction to the anxiety induction (but not affect 
regulation ability) then links between error reactivity and affective traits are a product of 
affect reactivity.  On the other hand, if the tendency to make errors in strings is related to 
the degree to which participants decrease in anxiety following the regulation 
manipulation (but not affect reactivity), then links between error reactivity and affective 
traits are a product of affect regulation ability.  
The Current Research 
Method 
Participants 
All participants were recruited from a psychology students participant pool at a 
large, private, Midwestern university and received partial course credit for participation 
(Age: M = 19.13, SD = 1.19; 76.9% female; 66.3 % Caucasian, 23.6% Asian, 6.3% 
African-American, 1.9% Hispanic).  A total of 208 participants were recruited for this 
study (conditions: control n = 70, distraction n = 70, reappraisal n = 68).  Assuming effect 
sizes of r = .25, power = .96. 
Materials 
 Affect Induction 
Anxiety was induced using a memory recall procedure.  Participants were 
instructed to, “Think of a recent experience in which you felt very anxious.  We would 
like you to write about that experience for the next five minutes.  Please describe exactly 
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what made you feel anxious.  Describe why this made you feel anxious.  Also describe 
what it felt like to be anxious: what were you thinking, what types of bodily sensations 
did you experience, etc.  Please be as specific and detailed as possible.”  Participants 
wrote about this anxiety provoking experience for five minutes.  
 Affect Regulation Manipulation 
Participants were randomly assigned to engage in one of three affect regulation 
tasks: control, reappraisal, or distraction.  Instructions for the control condition (adapted 
from Hemenover et al., 2008) were, “For the next 5 minutes we would like you to list 
your thoughts as they occur to you. On the lines below, list whatever thoughts are 
going through your mind. List any thought that occurs to you.”  Instructions for the 
reappraisal condition (adapted from Hemenover et al., 2008) were, “Sometimes when bad 
things happen, they can also have some positive consequences. For the next 5 minutes we 
would like you to list some good things that occurred as a result of the anxiety experience 
you just wrote about. In other words, what are some positive consequences of your 
anxiety provoking experience?”  Finally, instructions for the distraction condition 
(adapted from Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema 1998) were, “For the next five minutes we 
would like you to focus your thoughts and attention on things that are in no way relevant 
to the anxiety provoking experience you described earlier.  You may write about anything 
you like, as long as it is in no way related to the anxiety experience you just described.” 
 An independent coder reviewed each participant’s writing to determine if the 
participant followed the instructions (2 participants in the reappraisal condition did not 
follow instructions and were removed from the dataset). Additionally, to determine how 
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much effort was exerted during these tasks, the number of words each participant wrote 
was calculated. 
 Error Reactivity Measures 
The tendency to make errors in strings and post-error slowing was assessed using 
two different cognitive tasks, the AX-CPT and the Stroop.  In the AX-CPT (Braver, 
Cohen, & Barch, 2002), participants are presented with two letters in succession and 
asked to make one response if the letters are an A followed by an X and another response 
if any other combination of letters appears.  Each letter was presented for 125 
milliseconds (ms) and participants were given 400ms to respond on each of the 120 trials.  
A warning was presented if a response was not made during the 400ms response window.   
The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was administered in a similar manner as was used 
by Compton and colleagues (2008).  On each trial, individuals indicated the color of the 
font used for one of six color words (red, orange, yellow, green, blue, or purple). The task 
began with 24 practice trials that gave performance feedback.  Participants then 
completed four blocks of 80 trials (25 trials where the word and font color were 
congruent and 55 trials where the word and font color were incongruent).  Between 
blocks, participants were reminded of the correct response mapping (i.e. respond to font 
color, not the word itself).  To ensure task difficulty, responses were speeded, with the 
stimulus presented for 150ms and a response window of 1.0 seconds allowed.   
 Questionnaires 
 Affect. State affect was assessed using three adjective scales.  These scales 
measured negative (unhappy, miserable, sad, grouchy, gloomy, blue, distressed, annoyed, 
fearful, upset, hostile, angry; T1 α = .86, T2 α = .90, T3 α = .87), positive (enthusiastic, 
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elated, excited, euphoric, lively, peppy, happy, delighted, glad, cheerful, warmhearted, 
pleased; T1 α = .94, T2 α = .93, T3 α = .94), and anxious (nervous, jittery, anxious, tense, 
uneasy, worried, restless, on edge, anxiety, panicky; T1 α = .86, T2 α = .89, T3 α = .89) 
affect. Participants indicated the extent to which they were experiencing each affective 
state using a 5-point, very slightly or not at all – extremely, Likert-type scale.   
 Personality. Neuroticism was assessed using the full neuroticism subfacet scale 
from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, Johnson, Eber, Hogan, 
Ashton, Cloninger, & Gough, 2006).  The IPIP neuroticism scale is a 60 item scale that 
assesses neuroticism (M = 2.62, SD = .51, α = .94)as well as six subfacets of neuroticism 
(anxiety, M = 2.91, SD = .72, α = .84; anger, M = 2.47, SD = .70, α = .86; depression, M 
= 2.13, SD = .75, α = .88; self-consciousness, M = 2.75, SD = .75, α = .84; immoderation, 
M = 2.95, SD = .65, α = .77; vulnerability, M = 2.52, SD = .69, α = .86) using a 5-point, 
very inaccurate – very accurate, Likert-type scale.   
Procedure 
 Participants came into the lab in small groups for a study entitled “Personality and 
Affective Memory.”  They provided consent and then completed all personality and error 
reactivity measures, as well as a baseline affect measurement (affect T1).  They then 
underwent the affect induction procedure and completed a second affect measurement 
(affect T2).  Finally, participants were randomly assigned to complete one of the three 
affect regulation tasks (distraction, reappraisal, or control), completed the final affect 
measurement (affect T3), and were debriefed and released (see Figure 1). 
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Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 To ensure that the affect induction increased anxiety, and did so equally across 
conditions, a 2 (Time: Affect T1, T2) x 3 (Condition: control, reappraisal, distraction) 
mixed model analysis of variance was conducted for each affect measure (see Table 1 for 
all affect data).  For anxiety, results indicate a significant effect of time (F (1, 205) = 
21.12, p < .001, d = .27) that did not differ based on repair condition (time x condition 
interaction, F (2, 205) = 1.64, p = .20).   For negative affect, results indicate a significant 
effect of time (F (1, 205) = 5.75, p < .02, d = .14) that did not differ based on repair 
condition (time x condition interaction, F (2, 205) = .99, p = .37).   Finally, for positive 
affect, results indicate a significant effect of time (F (1, 205) = 37.92, p < .001, d = -.27) 
that did not differ based on repair condition (time x condition interaction, F (2, 205) = 
1.05, p = .35).   Thus, as intended, the anxiety induction resulted in significant increases 
anxiety and negative affect, and significant decreases in positive affect, and these effects 
were not dependent on repair condition. 
 To examine the cross-task reliability of the error reactivity measures (Stroop and 
AXCPT), error rates were compared across tasks.  Examining raw scores, the number of 
repeated errors (r  = .10, p = .16) and the proportion of repeated errors to total errors (r = 
.11, p = .13) were not significantly related across tasks, although the total number of 
errors were modestly related (r = .25, p < .001). Further, if the tendency to make errors in 
strings is calculated in a manner consistent with previous research (accuracy following 
errors – accuracy following correct responses: Compton et al., 2008), the relationship 
between tasks remains non-significant (r = .09, p = .17).  In addition, although the 
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relationships between neuroticism (r = .16, p < .05) and trait anxiety (r = .17, p < .01) and 
the tendency to make repeated errors (accuracy following errors – accuracy following 
correct responses) is significant for the AXCPT, it is not for the Stroop (neuroticism r = 
.08, p = .19; trait anxiety r = .01, p = .90).  For the tendency to slow down following an 
error (reaction time on a correct trial following an error trial minus reaction time on a 
correct trial following a correct trial; Compton et al., 2008), measures between tasks were 
again unrelated (r = -.06, p = .39).  As with the measure of the tendency to make errors in 
strings, post-error slowing was related to neuroticism and trait anxiety for the AX-CPT 
(Neuroticism r = -.20, p < .01; Anxiety r = -.14, p < .05), but not for the Stroop 
(Neuroticism r = .02, p = .75; Anxiety r = .08, p = .19).  Thus, assuming that it is possible 
to reliably measure the tendency to make errors in strings, these two tasks seem to be 
tapping different components of the error reactivity process. As such, rather than creating 
a conglomerate measure, each task will be examined separately in ensuing analyses. 
Repair Strategy Effectiveness 
To determine if affect repair effectiveness differed based on condition, several 
ANCOVAs were conducted with affect time 3 as the dependent variable, affect time 2 
entered as a covariate, and condition entered as the independent variable.  Results for 
anxiety (F (2, 204) = 11.62, p < .001), negative affect (F (2, 204) = 3.48, p < .05), and 
positive affect (F (2, 204) = 10.11, p < .001) all indicate that affect repair effectiveness 
differed based on condition.  Follow-up analyses using Student’s t tests indicates that 
participants in the reappraisal condition experienced larger decreases in anxious (t (136) 
= 2.65, p < .05, d = -.45) and negative affect (t (136) = 2.29, p < .05, d = -.39), and larger 
increases in positive affect (t (136) = -2.65, p < .05, d = .45), than did those in the control 
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condition. Those in the distraction condition experienced larger decreases in anxious 
affect (t (138) = 3.83, p < .05, d = -.65) and larger increases in positive affect (t (138) = -
3.97, p < .05, d = .67)  than did those in the control condition.  No other differences were 
observed between conditions (ts = -1.76 – 1.81, ns). Thus, affect repair effectiveness 
differed based on condition, with the reappraisal and distraction conditions leading to the 
most effective affect repair.  
To examine if participants’ effort during the repair task differed based on 
condition, an analysis of variance was conducted on the number of words each participant 
wrote during the repair task. Results indicate that effort did differ based on condition (F 
(2, 202) = 14.05, p < .05), with those in the control condition writing the most (M  = 
134.87, SD = 36.43), followed by those in the distraction (M = 122.76, SD = 29.30) and 
reappraisal conditions (M  = 106.15, SD  = 28.12).  Post-hoc comparisons (using a 
Bonferroni adjustment) indicate that participants in the control (Mean Dif = 28.72, SE = 
5.43, p < .05, d = .88) and distraction (Mean Dif = 16.61, SE = 5.45, p < .05, d = .58) 
conditions wrote more words than did those in the reappraisal condition.  Given the 
differences in word counts between conditions, it is possible that effort would be a 
determinant of repair effectiveness.  To examine this possibility, several hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses were conducted with affect time 3 as the dependent variable, 
affect time 2 entered on step 1 as a covariate, and word count entered on step 2 as the 
independent variable.  Results for anxiety (β = .02, t (202) = .35, p = .73), negative affect 
(β = -.07, t (202) = -1.36, p = .17), and positive affect (β = .02, t (202) = .40, p = .69) all 
indicate that effort did not predict repair effectiveness.  Given these results, effort will not 
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be considered as a possible moderator/covariate for any ensuing analyses of the 
predictors of repair effectiveness. 
Affect Reactivity 
 The following analyses were conducted to determine the degree to which 
neuroticism, trait anxiety, and error reactivity predict participants’ reactions to the 
anxiety induction.  To accomplish this, a number of hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis were conducted with affect time 2 entered as the dependent variable, affect time 
1 entered on step 1 as a covariate, and the relevant individual difference variable 
(neuroticism, trait anxiety, or error reactivity) entered on step 2 as the independent 
variable.  As would be expected based on prior research, neuroticism and trait anxiety 
predicted the degree to which participants reacted to the induction, with those higher in 
this traits showing larger increases in anxious (neuroticism β = .11, t (205) = 1.94, p < 
.05; anxiety β = .10, t (205) = 1.87, p < .065) and negative affect (neuroticism β = .10, t 
(205) = 1.83, p < .07; anxiety β = .11, t (205) = 2.12, p < .05), and larger decreases in 
positive affect (neuroticism β = -.15, t (205) = -3.35, p < .001; anxiety β = -.15, t (205) = 
-3.23, p < .001). 
 For the tendency to make errors in strings (calculated as accuracy following errors 
– accuracy following correct responses: Compton et al., 2008), error reactivity on the 
Stroop task did not predict anxiety reactivity (β = -.05, t (205) = -.91, p = .36), negative 
affect reactivity (β = -.04, t (205) = -.71, p = .48), or positive affect reactivity (β = .01, t 
(205) = .19, p  = .85).  Similarly, error reactivity on the AXCPT did not predict anxiety 
reactivity (β = -.08, t (205) = -1.41, p = .16), negative affect reactivity (β = -.09, t (205) = 
-1.72, p = .09), or positive affect reactivity (β = -.04, t (205) = -.89, p = .38).   
31 
 
For post error slowing, error reactivity on the Stroop task did not predict anxiety 
reactivity (β = -.10, t (205) = -1.88, p = .07), negative affect reactivity (β = -.02, t (205) = 
-.41, p = .68), or positive affect reactivity (β = .00, t (205) = .00, p = .99).  Similarly, error 
reactivity on the AXCPT did not predict anxiety reactivity (β = -.03, t (205) = -.53, p = 
.60), negative affect reactivity (β = -.06, t (205) = -1.19, p = .24), or positive affect 
reactivity (β = .08, t (205) = 1.84, p = .07).  Thus, although neuroticism and trait anxiety 
predicted affect reactivity, neither measure of error reactivity predicted affect reactivity.  
Affect Regulation Ability 
The following analyses were conducted to determine the degree to which 
neuroticism, trait anxiety, and error reactivity predict participants’ affect regulation 
ability (i.e., degree to which participants altered their affective states due to the repair 
task).  To accomplish this, a number of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were 
conducted in which affect time 3 was entered as the dependent variable, affect time 2 was 
entered on step 1 as a covariate (to control the effects of affect reactivity), the relevant 
individual difference variable (personality variables were centered) and the condition 
effect were entered on step 2, and the condition x individual difference variable 
interaction was entered on step 3.  The results of these analyses can be viewed in Tables 2 
- 4. 
Results indicate that, consistent with prior research (Shulman et al., 2006), 
neuroticism predicts negative affect repair.  However, neuroticism does not significantly 
predict anxiety or positive affect repair, nor are any of the effects interacting with 
condition.  Trait anxiety does not significantly predict the repair of any type of affect and 
trait anxiety does not interact with condition.  Finally, neither the tendency to make errors 
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in strings (accuracy following errors – accuracy following correct responses) nor post-
error slowing predict, or interact with condition to predict, the repair of any type of affect. 
Although none of the condition x individual difference variable effects were 
significant, it is still possible that one of the individual difference variables may have an 
effect on affect repair in a particular condition.  To examine this, simple slopes follow-
ups were conducted (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  As seen in Table 5, although 
there is a main effect of neuroticism for negative affect repair, this effect is particularly 
strong in the reappraisal condition.  The results also reveal that both measures of the 
tendency to make errors in strings are related to anxiety repair in the control condition.  
Those who are more likely to make errors in strings experienced less anxious affect 
following the control condition manipulation.  Additionally, this tendency, as measured 
by the Stroop, predicts positive affect repair in the distraction condition, such that those 
who are more likely to make errors in strings were lower in positive affect following the 
distraction condition manipulation.  Post-error slowing on the Stroop predicts anxiety 
repair in the control condition and positive affect repair in the distraction condition, such 
that those with a greater tendency to slow down following an error displayed higher 
levels of anxiety and positive affect.  Additionally, post-error slowing on the AX-CPT 
predicts predicts the repair of all affect types in the control condition, such that those with 
a greater tendency to slow down following an error displayed higher levels of anxiety and 
negative affect, and lower levels of positive affect.  Finally, post-error slowing on the 
AX-CPT predicts positive affect repair in the distraction condition, such that those with a 
greater tendency to slow down following an error were lower in positive affect. 
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Discussion 
In this study, I sought to examine the potential mechanisms underlying previously 
observed associations between cognitive error reactivity and various parameters of 
affective experience.  Prior research suggests two competing mechanisms.  First, the 
tendency to make errors in string may be related to neuroticism and stress reactivity 
(Compton et al., 2008) due to the process of affect reactivity. If individuals react more 
strongly to environmental signals of negative affect, they may react in a similar manner 
to the negative cue of making an error on a cognitive task.  This relatively large reaction 
to making an error would disrupt responding on ensuing trials and thus, lead to a greater 
tendency to make an error following an error.  Second, these associations may be due to 
shared systems that underlie all regulation attempts, be they cognitive or affective.  
Following this explanation, any individual with deficits in one regulatory realm (i.e., 
affect regulation) would show, due to shared systems, regulatory deficits in another realm 
(i.e., cognitive error regulation).  To test these two alternative hypotheses, participants in 
this study first underwent an anxiety induction and then were randomly assigned to 
complete one of three affect repair tasks (reappraisal, suppression, or control condition).  
Neither the affect reactivity, nor the affect regulation ability, hypothesis were supported 
in this study. 
Personality and Affective Responses to Manipulations 
 The majority of research on both affect reactivity and regulation has focused on 
global negative affect, and not specific affects, such as anxiety (Augustine & Hemenover, 
2009).  As such, the design of this study allowed for an replication of several effects 
known in the literature and an extension of those effects  into the realm of anxiety 
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reactivity and regulation.  First, in terms of the effectiveness of the different strategies for 
the repair of anxiety, results indicate that affect repair effectiveness did differ based on 
condition. Participants in the reappraisal and distraction conditions experienced more 
effective affect repair than those in the control condition.  Moreover, while effort did 
differ based on condition, such that those in the distraction and control conditions wrote 
more words than those in the reappraisal condition, effort did not predict affect repair 
effectiveness.  Thus, consistent with other research regarding the effectiveness of 
distraction and reappraisal for the repair of global negative affect (Augustine & 
Hemenover, 2009), these strategies were highly effective for the elimination of anxious 
affect in this study.  In addition, there is something unique to the cognition underlying the 
implementation of these strategies, as the effort involved in implementation does not 
predict the degree to which one is successful at using these affect regulation strategies. 
 These data also extended research on affect reactivity into the realm of anxious 
affect.  Consistent with past research on reactivity to global negative affect (e.g., Larsen 
& Ketelaar, 1989), both neuroticism and trait anxiety predicted affect reactivity to the 
anxiety induction, such that those higher in these traits experienced larger increases in 
negative and anxious affect, and larger decreases in positive affect.  Thus, the reactivity 
processes which are a hallmark of the highly neurotic individual can also be observed 
when examining specific affects, such as anxiety.   
 Thus, this study replicated known effects; personality predicts the effects of affect 
inductions and reappraisal and distraction are effective affect repair strategies.  In 
addition, this study also allowed for the first examination of the potential predictors of 
anxiety repair ability.  In a series of studies by Hemenover and colleagues (2008), it was 
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found that neuroticism (and other negative affect traits) predicted the ability to repair 
both global negative affect and sadness.  In line with these findings, my results indicate 
that neuroticism predicts the ability to repair negative affect.  Further analyses indicate 
that the effect of neuroticism on negative affect repair is particularly strong in the 
reappraisal condition.  While I did observe a main effect of neuroticism on the repair of 
negative affect, there were no effects of neuroticism on the repair of positive or anxious 
affect.  Anxiety is highly related to neuroticism, forming a subfacet of this broad 
personality trait.  There are several reasons why those relatively high in neuroticism 
would be less able to repair negative affect, but similar effects were not observed for 
anxiety.   
First, in factor analytic studies, results consistently demonstrate that affective 
experience can be best described using two broad and orthogonal factors pertaining to 
negative and positive affect (i.e., Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  It may be that, by 
parsing out a unique portion of the negative affectivity factor and thus, loosing the 
structural cohesion of negative affect, the ability to detect individual differences in 
anxious affect is reduced.  This possibility also relates to a second potential explanation, 
with relatively strong cohesion amongst negative affects, it may be that the increased 
anxiety of the neurotic individual is a by product of a decreased ability to repair other 
negative affects.  As fluctuations in one type of negative affect are often accompanied by 
fluctuations in another, then a failure to regulate other affects, such as sadness, would be 
accompanied by increases (or relatively smaller decreases) in anxiety at a mean level.  
Finally, it may be that, while the neurotic individual does show deficits in the ability to 
repair other types of negative affects, they may be equally adept at repair anxiety as are 
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emotionally stable individuals.  If this were the case, then the increased anxiety of the 
neurotic  individual would be the results of other processes, not regulatory ability.  
Indeed, neuroticism did predict an increased reaction to the anxiety induction.  While this 
reactivity was controlled in order to examine repair ability, the increased reactivity has 
real world implications.  While they may be able to decrease anxious affect to the same 
degree as someone low in neuroticism, the highly neurotic individual would have a 
higher level of anxiety at the beginning of that attempt (due to increased reactivity) and 
thus, the same magnitude of affect repair in those low and high in neuroticism would still 
result in a higher level of anxiety for the neurotic.  In other words, the neurotic starts a 
repair attempt with more anxiety than an emotionally stable individual and, given the 
same efficacy of repair, the neurotic still has more anxious affect than the stable 
individual following repair. 
Error Reactivity 
 In this study, I utilized two different tasks, the Stroop and AX-CPT, to obtain 
measures of error reactivity.  Both tasks yielded a measure of the tendency to make errors 
in strings and a measure of the tendency to slow down following an error. Unfortunately, 
the tendency to make errors in strings did not correlate between tasks; the same result 
was obtained for the measure of post-error slowing.  This is unusual considering that 
similar results have been obtained with error reactivity measures from both the Stroop 
(Compton et al, 2008) and AX-CPT (Augustine & Larsen, 2010). However, this is not 
unusual when reaction time based measures are considered in a broader context.  While 
obviously not widely publicized due to a lack of significant findings, many cognitive 
tasks that are purported to tap the same underlying psychological constructs are not 
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correlated (Larsen, Augustine, Prizmic, & Bono, 2010).  Despite this measurement issue, 
these tasks still predict important outcomes, predict outcomes in similar manners, and are 
widely used in a number of literature areas.  Thus, despite the seeming disconnect 
between my measures of error reactivity, it is still possible that they would each predict 
the affective tendencies measured in this study, and do so in the same manner. 
 In line with this, the tendency to make errors in strings, as assessed using the AX-
CPT, was related to both neuroticism and trait anxiety, such that those higher in these 
traits were more likely to make errors in strings.  The tendency to make errors in strings, 
as assessed using the Stroop, was not related to either personality variable.  In addition, 
post-error slowing, as assessed using the AX-CPT, was related to both neuroticism and 
trait anxiety, such that those higher in these traits were less likely to slow down following 
an error.  These effects were not observed for the Stroop. The disconnect between 
correlates of measures stemming from the AX-CPT and Stroop is possibly due to the lack 
of a relationship between measures from these tasks.  It may be that the AX-CPT is 
reliably measuring error-reactivity processes while the Stroop is not.  However, past 
research and theory has indicated that, while the tendency to make errors in strings 
should be related to neuroticism, post-error slowing should only show an indirect 
relationship with neuroticism (Compton et al., 2008; Augustine & Larsen, 2010).  It may 
be that this indirect relationship between post-error slowing and neuroticism was 
observable in a direct manner due to the large sample size of this study.  In any case, 
measures of error reactivity taken from the AX-CPT are displaying relationships with 
other study variables that are consistent with past research.  
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Mechanisms Underlying Personality and Error Reactivity Relationships  
 To test whether associations between error reactivity and neuroticism are due to 
reactivity processes, I examined the degree to which error reactivity predicted 
participants’ reaction to the anxiety induction. Neither the tendency to make errors in 
strings nor post-error slowing predicted affect reactivity for anxious, negative, or positive 
affect.  Thus, affect reactivity processes do not seem to be driving the relationship 
between neuroticism and the tendency to make errors in strings. 
 To examine the possibility that shared regulatory systems are driving relationships 
between neuroticism and error reactivity, I examined the degree to which error reactivity 
predicted participants’ ability to repair the anxious affect that resulted from the affect 
induction.  No main effects on the repair of any type of affect (anxious, negative, or 
positive) and no condition interactions were observed for the tendency to make errors in 
strings or post-error slowing. Despite this, and in an attempt to further understand the 
nature (or lack thereof) of the results, the degree to which each variable predicted affect 
repair in each condition was examined.   
 Both measures (AX-CPT and Stroop) of the tendency to make errors in strings 
were related to anxiety repair in the control condition.  However, this effect is in the 
opposite direction as would be expected based on past research; those who are more 
likely to make errors in strings experienced less anxious affect following the control 
condition manipulation.  Additionally, this tendency, as measured by the Stroop, predicts 
positive affect repair in the distraction condition, such that those who are more likely to 
make errors in strings were lower in positive affect following the distraction condition 
manipulation. This effect is consistent with the notion that those with a greater tendency 
39 
 
to make errors in strings would be less able to engage in effective affect repair.  Thus, 
while the tendency to make errors in strings does seem to relate to affect repair ability, 
the effects are not consistent in direction, nor are the effects totally consistent with past 
research. 
 For post-error slowing as assessed with the Stroop, the tendency to slow down 
following an error predicts anxiety repair in the control condition and positive affect 
repair in the distraction condition, such that those with a greater tendency to slow down 
following an error displayed higher levels of anxiety and positive affect.  Additionally, 
post-error slowing on the AX-CPT predicts predicts the repair of all affect types in the 
control condition, such that those with a greater tendency to slow down following an 
error displayed higher levels of anxiety and negative affect, and lower levels of positive 
affect.  Finally, post-error slowing on the AX-CPT predicts positive affect repair in the 
distraction condition, such that those with a greater tendency to slow down following an 
error were lower in positive affect.  Those with a greater tendency to slow down 
following an error should, in theory, display greater affect repair ability.  Post-error 
slowing interacts with neuroticism, such that those high in neuroticism and high in post-
error slowing show lower levels of daily distress (Robinson, et al., 2007). In other words, 
when one slows down following an aversive stimulus (like an error, or signal of negative 
affect), one has more time to engage regulatory mechanisms, be they cognitive or 
affective, on an ensuing task/trial.  However, the majority of the within condition findings 
for post-error slowing indicate the opposite tendency, these individuals are less able to 
effectively engage in affect repair.  Thus, as was seen with the results for the tendency to 
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make errors in strings, while post error slowing does seem to be related to affect 
regulation ability, these effects are not in the expected direction. 
 There are several potential explanations for the disconnect between previous 
research and the findings of this study.  The first possible explanation is that our 
manipulations were unsuccessful.  However, the anxiety induction successfully increased 
anxious and negative affect, and decreased positive affect.  In addition, the study 
replicated known effects for the effectiveness of different types of affect regulation 
strategies.  Thus, both the induction and repair task were successfully implemented.  The 
second possible explanation is that the design of our study did not allow for the 
emergence of individual difference effects.  Again, this is not the case.  The finding that 
neuroticism predicted both anxiety reactivity and repair ability suggest that the study was 
indeed able to detect individual differences in these processes.  Third, it is possible that 
there is simply no link between error reactivity and the parameters of affective 
responding.  Given the lack of effects for affect reactivity and the inconsistent nature of 
effects for affect regulation ability, this is certainly a possibility.  However, this study did 
replicate the relationship between neuroticism/trait anxiety and the tendency to make 
errors in strings.  In addition, numerous studies have found associations between error 
reactivity and affective  processes (Robinson, et al., 2007; Compton et al., 2008; 
Augustine & Larsen, 2010).  However, the nature of this past research points to yet 
another possible explanation for the lack of and/or inconsistent nature of the findings in 
this study.  All previous research on the connection between error reactivity and affective 
processes has relied on field studies, in the form of intensive time sampling (i.e., daily 
diary, experience sampling, ecological momentary assessment).  It may be that, by taking 
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the reactivity and regulatory processes out of the real world and into a relatively 
contrived laboratory setting, some level of complexity was lost.  The complexity inherent 
in naturalistic settings, as well as the aggregation of experience through repeated 
measurement, may be required to observe these associations.  The specific components of 
a natural setting that would allow the emergence of effects are unknown, and I am 
hesitant to venture a guess as to what exactly might explain the dissociation between 
research settings.  However, given the number of findings linking error reactivity and 
affective experience, and especially considering that some effects were replicated in this 
study, it is somewhat unlikely that there is simply no link between error reactivity and the 
parameters of affective responding.  With a shortage of other explanations, the change of 
research setting seems the most likely explanation for the lack of and/or inconsistency of 
the findings of this study. 
Implications and Future Directions 
 The findings of this study have several implications for both the existing literature 
and future research regarding affect reactivity and regulation. First, if the lack of findings 
in this study is related to a removal of these processes from a naturalistic setting, then this 
should be verified.  It may be possible to test both a reactivity and a regulation ability 
explanation using intensive time sampling.  By using event contingent as well as random 
time sampling, one could potentially tease apart these two explanations.  In other words, 
if participants were randomly sampled for emotions to provide baselines and covariates, 
and participants recorded their reactions when they encountered affective events (event-
contingent recording), then one could potentially examine these hypotheses.  However, 
the design and conductance of this type of study would be extremely complicated and, 
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perhaps, unfeasible.  As such, with the possibility that the exact nature of error reactivity 
-  affect relationships can not be determined through laboratory based research, the 
mechanisms underlying these associations may remain unclear. 
 The results of this study also have implications for the study of affect regulation 
in general.  My results revealed that, as with global negative affect, reappraisal and 
distraction were the most effect means for repairing anxious affect.  There is a dearth of 
research examining the efficacy of affect regulation strategies for the repair of specific 
types of affect.  This study provides one of the first attempts to extend research on global 
affect regulation into the study of specific affects.  While these results were consistent 
with effects for global affect, it is possible that other specific negative affects (i.e., 
disgust, anger, etc.) may be better alleviated using other types of affect regulation 
strategies (i.e., distancing, social support, etc.).  Future research should continue to 
examine the effects of different types of affect regulation strategies on specific affects. 
 By looking at anxiety in particular, these results also shed light on the individual 
difference variables that drive the ability to use affect regulation strategies.  I found that 
neuroticism predicted the ability to repair negative, but not anxious affect following an 
anxiety induction.  This deviates from the relatively simple picture that one might 
construct of the highly neurotic individual; they are not simply higher in reactivity and 
lower in repair ability.  While the neurotic may show deficits in the ability to repair 
global negative affect, they do not show deficits in the ability to repair anxious affect.  
This is in line with other findings concerning the implementation of affect regulation 
attempts that show that the neurotic also engages in regulation during periods of high 
negative affect (Augustine & Larsen, in press). Thus, the picture for the highly neurotic 
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individual is not all bad.  While they may show certain affective deficits, there are also 
instances in which the neurotic individual seems to show a level of healthy affective 
functioning on par with their emotionally stable counterparts.  As research on the 
affective behaviors associated with neuroticism continues, more efforts should be made 
to determine, not only those instances wherein the neurotic individual shows deficits, but 
also those instances wherein the neurotic is relatively successful in managing their 
affective states.  
 Finally, the results of this study have implications for the use of a number of 
computerized tasks.  The lack of a relationship between a number of tasks that are 
supposed to be measuring the same underlying constructs should be of major concern to 
researchers using these tasks.  If viewed from a measurement perspective, it does not 
matter if these tasks are predicting outcomes in a similar or even consistent manner.  If 
they are intended to measure the same construct then they should be at least marginally 
correlated; the move from questionnaire based responding to a reaction time or error 
based measurement does not excuse these tasks from the basic psychometric 
requirements of valid measurement.  With relatively low test-retest values and few 
significant correlations amongst these tasks, it may be necessary to go back to the 
proverbial drawing board.  Although the study of “button-pushing psychology” continues 
to grow at a rapid pace, a step back to examine the measures and tasks used may be 
required.  
 In sum, error reactivity and affective experience do seem to be related.  Although 
the tendency to make errors in strings has been consistently related to neuroticism and to 
real world affective responses in past research, this study failed to determine whether two 
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specific mechanisms underlie these associations.  Hopefully, continued research into the 
relationships between affective and cognitive response tendencies will eventually yield an 
explanation for these effects.   
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Table 1 
Affect data 
 Across 
Conditions 
Distraction 
Condition 
Reappraisal 
Condition 
Control 
Condition 
NA Time 1 1.40 (.45) 1.38 (.42) 1.41 (.51) 1.43 (.43) 
NA Time 2 1.47 (.54) 1.44 (.56) 1.53 (.66) 1.45 (.38) 
NA Time 3 1.28 (.41) 1.21 (.39) 1.29 (.47) 1.35 (.34) 
Anxiety Time 1 1.83 (.62) 1.85 (.63) 1.86 (.65) 1.80 (.61) 
Anxiety Time 2 2.02 (.76) 2.11 (.81) 1.94 (.78) 2.02 (.68) 
Anxiety Time 3 1.71 (.63) 1.59 (.57) 1.62 (.59) 1.92 (.68) 
PA Time 1 1.93 (.80) 1.93 (.81) 1.93 (.84) 1.95 (.75) 
PA Time 2 1.72 (.78) 1.78 (.89) 1.69 (.80) 1.68 (.66) 
PA Time 3 1.99 (.86) 2.24 (.94) 1.98 (.87) 1.75 (.70) 
Note: N = 208; NA = negative affect, PA = positive affect; all data are presented as Mean 
(SD) 
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Table 2 
Neuroticism, Trait Anxiety, and Repair Effectiveness 
  Neuroticism Trait Anxiety 
Level  Anxiety NA PA Anxiety NA PA 
1 Affect T2 .64 (12.02*) .67 (12.94*) .76 (16.97*) .64 (12.02*) .67 (12.94*) .76 (16.97*) 
2 ID .02 (.37) .11 (-2.01*) .05 (.95) -.03 (-.43) .01 (.16) .06 (1.37) 
 Condition -.24 (-4.66*) -.13 (-2.46*) .19 (4.51*) -.24 (-4.69*) -.13 (-2.49*) .19 (4.49*) 
3 ID x Condition -.19 (-1.42) -.15 (-1.09) .05 (.42) -.02 (-.15) -.01 (-.06) .01 (.07) 
Note: N = 208; data presented as β (t); *p < .05; ID = individual difference predictor, NA = negative affect, PA = positive affect 
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Table 3 
The Tendency to make Errors in Strings and Repair Effectiveness 
  AXCPT Repeated Errors Stroop Repeated Errors 
Level  Anxiety NA PA Anxiety NA PA 
1 Affect T2 .64 (11.78*) .67 (12.80*) .76 (16.79*) .64 (11.78*) .67 (12.80*) .76 (16.79*) 
2 ID -.02 (-.40) -.03 (-.60) -.02 (-.34) -.08 (-1.58) -.02 (-.28) -.06 (-1.29) 
 Condition -.23 (-4.42*) -.13 (-2.42) .20 (4.53*) -.23 (-4.48*) -.13 (-2.46*) .20 (4.55*) 
3 ID x Condition -.09 (-.39) -.14 (-.65) .29 (1.59) .19 (.58) -.02 (-.08) -.14 (-.51) 
Note: N = 208; data presented as β (t); *p < .05; ID = individual difference predictor, NA = negative affect, PA = positive affect 
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Table 4 
Post-Error Slowing and Repair Effectiveness 
  AXCPT Post-Error Slowing Stroop Post-Error Slowing 
Level  Anxiety NA PA Anxiety NA PA 
1 Affect T2 .64 (11.98*) .67 (12.85*) .77 (17.02*) .64 (11.98*) .67 (12.85*) .77 (17.02*) 
2 ID .04 (.76) .04 (.82) -.05 (-1.05) .02 (.36) .02 (.37) .02 (.45) 
 Condition -.23 (-4.42*) -.13 (-2.45*) .20 (4.52*) -.24 (-4.60*) -.13 (-2.48*) .19 (4.46*) 
3 ID x Condition .04 (.31) -.08 (-.58) .09 (.76) -.01 (-.09) -.14 (-.98) .07 (.58) 
Note: N = 208; data presented as β (t); *p < .05; ID = individual difference predictor, NA = negative affect, PA = positive affect 
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Table 5 
Predictors of Affect Repair Effectiveness in each Condition 
ID Affect Control Reappraisal  Distraction  
Neuroticism Anxiety .08 (1.43) -.01 (-.24) -.01 (-.23) 
 NA .08 (1.56) .11 (1.97*) .01 (.12) 
 PA .01 (.26) .03 (.73) .03 (.60) 
Trait Anxiety Anxiety -.01 (-.08) -.03 (-.55) .01 (.02) 
 NA -.01 (-.16) .03 (.63) -.01 (-.12) 
 PA .03 (.71) .06 (1.36) .02 (.52) 
Stroop Repeated Errors Anxiety -.39 (-2.56*) -.19 (-1.28) -.12 (-.75) 
 NA -.13 (-.83) -.01 (-.07) .02 (.12) 
 PA -.05 (-.36) -.18 (-1.37) -.27 (-2.10*)  
AXCPT Repeated Errors Anxiety -.18 (-2.13*) -.02 (-.26) .07 (.81) 
 NA -.14 (-1.64) -.02 (-.20) -.01 (-.12) 
 PA .10 (1.35) -.02 (-.32) -.10 (-1.34) 
Stroop Error Slowing Anxiety .13 (2.32*) .00 (.02) -.10 (-1.72) 
 NA .09 (1.68) .01 (.22) -.07 (-1.30) 
 PA -.08 (-1.68) .02 (.31) .12 (2.57*) 
AXCPT Error Slowing Anxiety .13 (2.41*) .02 (.36) -.04 (-.71) 
 NA .12 (2.29*) .00 (.02) -.01 (-.21) 
 PA -.11 (-2.49*) -.08 (-1.66) .09 (1.96*) 
Note: N = 208; data presented as β (t); *p < .05; ID = individual difference predictor, NA 
= negative affect, PA = positive affect 
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Figure 1 
Experimental Procedure 
 
 
